How does the “End Game” strategy take shape in the minds of U.S. leaders?

In the absence of a rational and well thought strategy, the “End Game” can be a total game changer in the political scene, leading to irremediable mistakes, the consequences of which can be extremely costly in the broad sense of the word. As a political analyst, I have reached the conclusion that any strategic action that does not plunge into the roots of strategic planning, and cannot visualize the ultimate impacts or the final outcomes of its actions is, in essence, a neglectful, inadequate and wrong strategy that will most probably lead to political disasters.

In my series of articles on the Arab Spring, I have time and again stated and pointed out the numerous evidences which attest to the lack of a cohesive vision among the U.S. policy makers when it comes to matters of foreign policy—in particular in the Middle East. A well known example of such an evidence, among many others, was when the US trained and armed the radical Islamists in Afghanistan in order to fight against the Soviets in the eighties. Supplying billions of dollars in arms to the Afghan Mujahideen militants was one of the CIA’s longest and most expensive covert operations. At least 3 billion in U.S. dollars were funneled into the country to train and equip troops with weapons; however, at the final stage or the “End Game,” the Islamists waged a hideous fight against the US, that ultimately lead to the tragedy of September 11, 2001, killing thousands of people.

Another evidence of such a miscalculation can be found when the U.S. extended support to the Islamists in Iran in 1979, hoping that they would take the initiative of fighting against the Soviets along the joint borders with Iran. But the U.S. was in fact surprised with the result of the “End Game”—as the Iranians decided to fight against the U.S. instead of fighting against the Soviets. The Iranians started their attack on the U.S. by occupying the American Embassy in Tehran in November of that same year and by taking the embassy personnel as hostages.

Enumerating the countless U.S. mistakes is not the objective of this article; mistakes which have caused havoc on U.S. interests. The actual reason behind these miscalculations is that the U.S. only glanced at the immediate effects of the questions, without digging deeper or doing further research and analysis in order to find out if there could be other potential consequences to that strategy; thus turning the strategy of the “End Game” into an utter failure.

Perhaps one of the most well known noteworthy mistakes committed by the U.S. was the 2003 invasion of Iraq. That invasion launched by George W. Bush aimed at exploiting the Iraqi oil on one hand, and also taking revenge for his father by arresting and executing Saddam Hussein, on the other. During a campaign speech in September 2002, Bush cited a number of reasons—in addition to alleged terrorist links and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) about why Saddam was so dangerous to the U.S., noting, in particular that, ”After all, this is the guy who tried to kill my dad.” He was referring, of course, to an alleged plot by Iraqi intelligence to assassinate Bush’s father, former president George H.W. Bush, during his triumphal visit to Kuwait in April 1993.

The Iraqi invasion targeted Baathists and Sunnis alike; however, its direct outcome was the intensification of the stance of the Shiite Sect, an important percentage of which are loyal to Iran. It also brought Nouri al-Maliki, a friend of Iran, to power as the prime minister of Iraq.

It is clearly evident that George W. Bush had not taken sufficient time to thoroughly study the situation well before proceeding with the invasion of Iraq. All his attention was focused on arresting the arch enemy of the U.S.—Saddam Hussein. Thus, at the end, Bush Jr. executed Saddam without taking into account the fact that his action would be a game changer on the ground, which ultimately resulted in Iran gaining a foothold in Iraq. This was totally contradictory to the 1991 calculations of his father’s administration. At that time his father was forced to unilaterally announce an immediate and a swift ceasefire against the Iraqi forces. That ceasefire was aimed at enabling the Iraqi armed forces to fight against the Iranian Revolutionary Forces that had penetrated deep into the Iraqi territory in an attempt to install a new government in Iraq in 1991 which would be friendly to Iran. However, due to the poor insight and miscalculations of George Bush Jr. that Iranian dream came true in 2003, because he had not studied the essential and the subsequent results of the “End Game” strategy.

Finally, the most recent of such mistakes can be seen in the U.S instigation of war against Syria with the hope of toppling the regime of Basher Al-Assad, and in the hope of putting an end to the last regime, or the pocket of resistance standing in the way of Arabs for reaching peace with the U.S. ally -Israel. However, this war has not led to the downfall of the Syrian regime which is an ally of Iran. In fact the war has consolidated the stance of the Syrian government which is backed by the Russian Republic, which seekss to maintain its strategic interests in Syria.

The Russian interests among others had not been taken into account or no attempt has been made for an in-depth strategic study by the U.S. before announcing plans to arm Syrian insurgents. The U.S. policy makers predicted the downfall of Bashar Al-Assad shortly after the outbreak of the war in Syria, thinking of a similar scenario to what had taken place with the Tunisian Bin Ali and the Egyptian Hosni Mubarak, as well as with the Libyan Mua’mer Al-Qaddafi.

The Soviet reactions and their pertinent evaluation of the situation awakened the “Russian Bear” that the U.S. policy makers believed to have been fast asleep. They even thought that the bear was anesthetized, especially that the degree of support for Mr. Boris Yeltsin from the American security services was disclosed by Seymour Hersh, one of the United States’ best-known investigative journalists, fueling allegations by Mr. Yeltsin’s opponents that he took power thanks to American support. The U.S. failed to calculate the prompt and sudden Russian awakening that stood up strong against the American desire to put an end to the last vital Russian stronghold in the Middle East. This sudden awakening of the “Russian Bear” had not been taken into consideration or even expected when evaluating the American strategies which appeared to be based on daydreams.

Thus, without a thorough and in-depth strategic research on the manner of the downfall of Bashar, without a careful estimation of the flip sides of the matter or unexpected complications that might arise as a result of the “End Game”, the U.S. once again had adopted a hasty and reckless strategy. And the indirect and perhaps the most unexpected aftermath for the U.S hasty strategy was that instead of causing the downfall of Bashar al-Assad and the installation of a new “moderate” government in Syria, friendly to the U.S., it turned out that the forces expected to replace Assad if and when he falls would be either the radical Sulfi or Al-Nusra Group and Da’esh or Iraq and Al-Sham state extremists—officially affiliates of Al-Qaeda—the most evident enemy of the United States! Thus replacing President Assad with the Al-Qaeda forces will undoubtedly bear much more serious and grave consequences than the current differences between Assad and the U.S.

The U.S. and some of its Arab and Turkish allies, who opened their borders in order to allow weapons and fighters to pass through, have once again showcased their shallow thinking when planning strategic moves. Clearly, the policy makers merely look at the superficial results without evaluating the core results, or unexpected and subsequent surprises which may occur in any given situation. The largest surprise of all has been that of radical Islamists and, had they not feared that Al-Qaeda groups would replace President Assad, they may have attempted to cut some sort of a deal with the Russians.

What is shocking is that neither the Americans nor the Turks and some Arab leaders who participated in fuelling the flames of the war in Syria, have at any time estimated the dangers and consequences in the Syrian territory. In fact they have only very recently realized the existence of the dangers of “Al-Qaeda” which has already set foot in Syria and, thereby, constitutes a real danger not only to the U.S. or Turkey, but also to all the neighboring countries.

Its only recently that Secretary of State John Kerry referred to the danger of Al-Qaeda, calling all the countries that supply weapons to the opposition to make sure that the weapons will not fall in the hands of the “wrong sides” (i.e., Al-Nusra and Da’esh). The Turkish president, Gul, issued a statement expressing fears that the region would be transferred into another Afghanistan.

It is certainly time for a wake-up call; it is time to end hesitations and the snail pace of the world leaders in understanding the realities of the Syrian crises and its hidden dangers. It actually took them two long years to realize that danger, despite the warnings of numerous writers, including myself. I personally have written time and again but in vain warning against the dangers of what is taking place in Syria. This is because of the political simplicity of American and some Arab leaders who could not understand the scope of what was happening there.

One of my previous articles contained accounts of some severe and ugly acts committed by Al-Qaeda and its Sulfi followers. Those acts included devouring a Syrian soldier’s heart, the reported act of decapitating a Christian Father Paulo and the imprisonment of two bishops, in addition to the serious threats of killing of Christians once the radicals emerged victorious in their war. The article also contained numerous criminal acts committed against innocent civilians whether in Kurdish or in Alawite areas. Therefore, apart from the destabilization of the country, we have seen mayhem, murders, displacement of a huge number of people as refugees, and the emergence of an immense danger emanating from Al-Qaeda at the gates of the rest of Middle Eastern countries. In other words, we see a huge mess which is rather dangerous not only for the Middle-East, but also for the entire world. Does the U.S. really think that this basically barbaric Al-Qaeda linked opposition is going to bring a peaceful parliamentary democracy in the post Assad Syria?

In one of my articles I had raised the question about why the US drones target Al-Qaeda bases in Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan and refrain from bombing Al-Qaeda sites in Syria? If “Da’esh or Iraq and Al-Sham State” officially announce that they are part of Al-Qaeda, why then do Americans hesitate to target them in Syria? In contrast, the Americans target similar elements in Yemen, in the Pakistani areas adjacent to the Afghan Borders, besides, even targeting them in the heart of Afghanistan.

In another previous article I had asked the question: “when will Obama replace the name of Syria into Syriastan?” The article was dedicated to shedding light on one topic: the composition of the Syrian armed opposition, showing the complexity of the facts on the battleground; the Al-Qaeda affiliate group (namely Al-Nusra headed by Abu Mohammed Al-Gholani and Da’esh group headed by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi) .The group Ahrar Al-Sham, is said to have 30 thousand fighters in its ranks. The fighters in those groups are the most ferocious in the current war and have scored many points in their attacks against the Syrian army. They are in control of an important area in northern Syria and, amazingly enough, they all are loyal to the political agenda of Al-Qaeda, under the leadership of Aymen Al-Dhawahri.

Another group is that of Sulfis Brigades with a political program that aims at declaring an Islamic Emirate in Syria to replace the current secular state. The multiple groups that come under its command are the Islam Al-Tawheed and Al-Farouq Brigades. Finally there is the Free Syrian Army—a group that defected from the regular Syrian Army, and to which some civilians have joined from the areas under the control of the Free Army. There are of course dozens of smaller groups fighting alongside these main groups.

In one of my articles I asked the question: “Is there an honest Qaeda and evil Qaeda?” The reasons that incite the American drones to bomb Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan and even Somalia, yet prevent them from bombing the Al-Qaeda sites in Syria.

In reality, the U.S. is not attacking Da’esh in Syria, only because the latter is fighting Bashar Al-Assad whom they wish to topple. What are the reasons for the U.S. not attacking or pursuing Da’esh that is responsible for the quasi-daily explosions in Iraq, through car bombs that kill tens of innocent civilians? Despite the fact that that the U.S. controls the Iraqi territories through its satellites and AWACS planes that monitor the smallest movement on the ground, why did the U.S. not inform the Iraqi government about the information collected by its planes and help the Iraqi government abort some of those explosions, in order to undermine these Al-Qaeda activities for which it bears no affection?

Can it be that the U.S. did not wish to do so because Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki is a friend of Iran—if not an ally? And since Iran is America’s enemy, therefore the latter did not want to extend aid to Al Maliki? And now that Almaliki has met with President Obama, and as the ice is starting to melt between the US and Iran, following a phone conversation between Hassan Rouhani and Obama, observers have noted that Iraq has recently managed to foil two car bomb explosions in Iraq. They also noticed that the number of explosions has somewhat decreased since that meeting in Washington. Has the US suddenly remembered or realized that the Iraqi Da’esh is the actual evil since it is an affiliate of Al-Qeda?

The Americans, despite their immense means for information and intelligence gathering, the CIA, AWACS planes and espionage spying satellites, to name a few, often fall into pitfalls due to their misinterpretation of the facts. As Godfrey Bloom, a member of the EU parliament and a US independent party said: “What they seem not to understand is that when they go into these countries, when they influence these countries, they don’t seem to have an end game strategy.” The U.S. refused to admit before the world that they were going to commit a monumental mistake by attacking Syria in order to oust President Assad—because they failed to deeply study and evaluate the strategic consequences of what might happen as a result of unexpected interactions and strategic complications that would lead to a perilous situation at the end of the “End Game” strategy.

Michel Haj is a writer & Middle East Political Analyst based in Amman, Jordan, Member of Jordanian (E) Writers Association- (currently writing series of articles entitled “Questions Awaiting Answers on the Arab Spring?” Contact him at Michelhaj18@gmail.com.

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